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SYMPOSIUM

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW OF CREDIT
ENHANCEMENT: DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL

ABSTRACT PAYMENT UNDERTAKINGS
IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
Roy Goode*
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Introduction
In the Middle Ages, long before the advent of national
commercial law, there had developed under the influence of the
Italian merchants an increasingly systematised body of rules
based on commercial custom and practice and administered by
the merchants courts. Over time, this became received
throughout Europe, giving rise to a cosmopolitan lex mercatoria, which not only contained rules for typical business transactions, but also addressed cases in which the dispute contained a foreign element, thus laying the foundations of modern private international law. With the rise of the nation state,
commercial law became increasingly domestic in character; and
even today, when English lawyers or French lawyers speak of
the law of international trade, what they mean is the English
law of international trade or the French law of international
trade.
But the past 30 years have witnessed a resurgence in the
* Norton Rose Professor of English Law in the University of Oxford and
Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford.
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idea of a truly international lex mercatoria,distinguished from
domestic law by the label "transnational commercial law."
Principal among the international organisations that have
contributed to the drive toward harmonisation of commercial
law are the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the Hague Conference, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the
European Community (EC). These and other organisations
have used a variety of instruments to promote greater uniformity in international trade transactions. They include binding
instruments, such as conventions and directives; facultative
instruments, such as model laws and uniform rules; private
institutional rules and formulations of trade terms which are
given effect by contractual incorporation; advisory opinions;
and codifications of contract law by scholars from many jurisdictions.
Two fields of commercial activity in which harmonisation
measures have been particularly vigorous are transport and
banking. This paper is concerned with the latter. In the past
seven years alone we have seen new revisions of the ICC's
INCOTERMS, 1 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP),2 and Uniform Rules for Collections;' formulations of new Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees
(URDG)4 and ICC Model Forms for Contract Bonds,' the
UNIDROIT Conventions on International Factoring' and International Financial Leasing,7 the U.N. Convention on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory
Notes8 and the UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Let-

1. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 460, INCOTERMS (1990).
2. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500, UNIFORM CUSTOMS

AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993) [hereinafter U.C.P.].
3. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 522, UNIFORM RULES
FOR COLLECTIONS (1995).
4. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 458, UNIFORM RULES
FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES (1992).
5. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 524, ICC UNIFORM
RULES FOR CONTRACT BONDS (1993).

6. UNEDROIT Convention on International Factoring, done May 28, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 943.
7. UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, done May 28,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 931.
8. United Nations Convention on International Bills of Exchange and Interna-
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ters of Guarantee and Standby Credits.
The present paper is devoted to abstract payment undertakings by banks in international trade: undertakings which
are given to support a trading transaction between the bank's
customer and the customer's counterparty but which are considered in law distinct from and largely independent of that
transaction. Specifically I want to focus on two payment instruments, the documentary credit and the demand guarantee/standby credit, in the context of the 1993 UCP revision, the
URDG and, more briefly, the UNCITRAL convention. I do not
propose to say anything about suretyship guarantees. Nor will
I discuss the so-called "direct pay" standby, since, being a simple-minded man, I do not understand how a credit can at one
and the same time be a direct pay credit and standby!
B. The PeculiarNature of Abstract Payment Undertakings
Payment undertakings of the kind I shall be examining do
not fall within ordinary contract principles. They do not involve offer and acceptance (being considered binding as from
the time of issue unless and until rejected by the beneficiary);
they do not depend on consideration or reliance by the promisee; they are not governed by any special formal requirements
(such as a deed); and they fit neither the definition of a bilateral contract nor that of a unilateral contract. They are best
regarded as mercantile specialties, undertakings which, by the
usage of merchants, have effect by virtue of their issue without
any additional requirements. Leading American scholars treat
such undertakings as engagements rather than as contractual
promises in the strict sense.9 English writers tend to regard
them as contractual in character since the grounds for avoiding
them and the remedies for their breach are determined by
ordinary contract principles. We need not be overly concerned
about the difference in approach, which (once one accepts the
binding force of such undertakings) will in most cases be of
little practical consequence.

tional Promissory Notes, G.A. Res. 165, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 41, at
280, U.N. Doc. A/43/41 (1989).
9. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOLAN, LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 1 3.03 (2d ed.
1991).
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C. Characteristicsof Abstract Payment Undertakings
Documentary credits and demand guarantees have several
characteristics in common. Both are abstract payment undertakings, so that they are not required to conform to the ordinary conditions for a valid and binding contract. Both are autonomous in character, so that in principle the bank's duty is
to pay against conforming documents without regard to whether, in the case of documentary credits, there has been proper
performance of the underlying contract by the beneficiary or, in
the case of demand guarantees, there has been a breach of the
underlying contract. Both are documentary in character, so
that the obligation is triggered solely by presentation of documents within the time and on the terms specified in the undertaking without regard to external facts or events. In both cases
the bank fulfills its duty by paying against documents which
appear, on reasonable examination, to conform to the credit.
This occurs even if it transpires that without the bank's knowledge one or more of the documents has been forged or fraudulently altered or contains false data. But in other respects
there are crucially important differences between documentary
credits and demand guarantees to which I shall advert a little
later.
D. The Nature and Scope of the UCP and the URDG
For those not familiar with the UCP and the URDG, I
should explain that these are in substance model rules of
banking custom and practice which largely, though not entirely, represent and codify existing custom and practice and are
given effect by incorporation into all relevant contracts: between the principal (or applicant for the credit) and the issuing
bank; between the issuing bank and the beneficiary; between
the confirming bank or authorised negotiating bank and the
beneficiary; and between the different banks themselves. The
ICC, though an international organisation, is not a law-making
body but an organisational representation of world business
and finance. Its rules do not have the force of law but depend
(as the rules themselves expressly provide) on the parties to
contracts incorporating them as terms of their contracts. It
follows that the UCP and the URDG are necessarily confined
to matters capable of being dealt with by contract. So they
cannot deal with such matters as the effect of fraud on a
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beneficiary's right to payment, the grant of injunctive relief to
restrain presentation of documents or payment, or the relations between a contracting party and third parties. Moreover,
however detailed the rules, there remain key issues which
have had to be worked out by the courts and to which I will
turn shortly.
E. Status of the UCP
The current version of the UCP is that published in 1993
and known as UCP 500.10 This replaced the 1983 version
(UCP 400)." Since the UCP take effect by contractual incorporation, they may be amended or excluded as the parties
wish. Over time the UCP have gained universal acceptance in
international trade. So pervasive is their use that the revised
article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code specifically defers to
them, providing that it is not to apply to the extent that the
parties expressly adopt the UCP.12
F. What the New UCP Can Do
The new UCP clarify various matters that were doubtful
under UCP 400, e.g., as to what is meant by negotiation 3 and
whether a bank is obliged to agree to a transfer of a transferable credit. They change what was previously a presumption of
revocability into a presumption of irrevocability, 14 in line with
the general desire and understanding of the market. They
introduce the international standard banking practice as the
yardstick against which to measure compliance of the documents with the terms of the credit. They nullify (or at any rate
purport to nullify) non-documentary conditions. They introduce
the principle of one bite of the cherry, requiring a bank that
rejects documents to state all discrepancies at the time of rejection. And they introduce changes designed to accommodate
developments in transport modes and documents and electronic means of communication.

10. See supra note 2.
11. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 400, UNIFORM CUSTOMS
AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1983).

12. U.C.C. art. 5 (1993).
13. U.C.P. art. 10(b)(ii) (1993).
14. Id. art. 6(a).
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G. What the New UCP Cannot Do
It is important to bear in mind that the UCP, like any
other rules promulgated by the ICC, are primarily intended to
guide banking practice relating to documentary credits, not to
provide a comprehensive treatment of legal rights and duties.
In line with this, the UCP provide no more than a very
generalised statement as to the compliance standard; and they
do not prescribe the exceptions to the principle of the autonomy of the credit, leaving these and related matters to be dealt
with by decisions of the courts.
II. DOCUMENTARY CREDITS
In this section I shall confine myself to three issues: the
standard of compliance, the treatment of non-documentary
conditions, and the circumstances in which the courts will
depart from the principle of autonomy of the credit.
A. The Standard of Compliance
A crucial question, which has long dogged bankers and
their legal advisors, is how strictly the documents must conform to the terms of the credit. Is the standard a strict standard, so that even the most minor deviations entitle the bank
to refuse payment, and, indeed, oblige it to do so unless otherwise authorised by the applicant for the credit? Or is it a substantial compliance standard, under which deviations that the
bank has no reason to believe are of commercial significance
are ignored? Or does the law adopt a bifurcated approach,
under which the bank is entitled to invoke a strict standard of
compliance against the beneficiary but is entitled to the benefit
of a more relaxed standard vis-a-vis its customer in choosing to
pay despite minor deviations?
Most courts appear to adopt a strict standard of compliance. But this is not the same as exact compliance. In particular, obvious typographical errors will be disregarded. This
principle is, however, easier to state than to apply. Take the
Hong Kong case Hing Yip Hing Fat Co. Ltd. v. Daiwa Bank
Ltd., 5 in which the name "Cheergoal Industries Limited" was
incorrectly reproduced as "Cheergoal Industrial Limited." The

15. [1991] 2 H.KL.R. 35 (High Court).
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bank paid despite the error and Judge Kaplan held that it was
entitled to do so, the error being purely typographical." But is
it reasonable to suppose that the bank would have been within
its rights in rejecting the documents, for how could it be sure
that there was not a separate company Cheergoal Industrial
Limited? This suggests two conclusions. First, if the error
proves to be typographical, the bank can retrospectively justify
its acceptance of the documents even if at the time it simply
failed to notice the discrepancy. Second, there is no necessary
correlation between a right to pay and a duty to pay; here the
bank had a choice whether to pay or to refuse payment.
1. International banking practice as a compliance standard
The advantage of a strict rule is that it is reasonably clear
and absolves the bank from making judgmental decisions. But
at the international level there are straws in the wind indicating that the rule of strict compliance may come under pressure.
In the first place, the UCP contain a new provision, in
article 13(a), which may have unintended consequences. It
states in part:
Compliance of the stipulated documents on their face with
the terms and conditions of the Credit, shall be determined
by international standard banking practice as determined by
these Articles.'
A similar provision is to be found in article 13(2) of the 1995
UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and
Standby Letters of Credit. Now one can see the good sense of
an international standard. After all, the whole purpose of the
UCP is to harmonise banking practice and to prescribe a uniform set of rules. The adoption of different compliance standards in different jurisdictions tends to undermine the very
uniformity the rules are designed to promote. But this problem
is inherent in uniform rules, whether they are rules incorporated by contract or rules prescribed by an international convention. Except where jurisdiction to give definitive rulings is
conferred on a supranational body-as in the case of the Euro16. Id. at 45.
17. U.C.P. art. 13(a) (1993).
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pean Court of Justice as regards the interpretation of the 1968
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments" and the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable
to contractual obligations' --the risk of divergence among national courts is inevitable. The risk is exacerbated by the difficulty of discovering rulings in other jurisdictions in the absence of a truly international system of law-reporting. In the
case of documentary credits the ICC's Banking Commission
renders valuable service through its interpretative opinions,
but these, though persuasive, are not binding on courts.
Although an appeal to an international standard is understandable, what exactly does this mean and where is it to be
found? Article 13(a) does not prescribe an international standard in the abstract but "international banking practice as
reflected in these Rules."' ° The same article requires banks to
examine documents with reasonable care.2 ' Certain tolerances
are expressly provided by article 39. Thus the words "about,"
"approximately," or "circa" or similar words used in connection
with the amount of the credit or the quantity or unit price
stated in the credit are to be construed as allowing a difference
not exceeding 10% more or 10% less;' and a tolerance of 5%
more or 5% less in the quantity of goods is permissible unless
the credit stipulates the quantity must not be exceeded or
reduced or the extra would take the drawings above the
amount of the credit.' But this tells us nothing about the
standard of compliance in relation to other matters. Indeed, on
the principle expressio unius alterius, article 39 might suggest
that other tolerances are not permitted.
Article 13(a) is evidently intended to deter courts from
being on the one hand too ritualistic in treating documents as
non-conforming where the defects are trivial and obvious, and
on the other from being too liberal by invoking considerations
such as good faith or lack of commercial significance of the

18. Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of
the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 97.

19. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for
signature June 19, 1980, O.J. (L 266) 1.
20. U.C.P. art. 13(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 39(a).
23. Id. art. 39(b).
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discrepancy. The difficulty is to know not only where to draw
the line but also where international standard banking practice is to be found. It is always easier to identify local practices
than international ones, even in relation to international
transactions. Just as the law of international trade is still not
truly international but consists of different national laws governing international trading transactions, so also banking
practice will not necessarily be the same around the globe.
What is done in London and New York is not necessarily what
is done in Zurich or Singapore. This in turn leads to the question how far the standard is to be influenced by the size and
degree of expertise reasonably to be expected of a bank located
in the country of the issuing or confirming bank. Is this relevant at all? Or are all banks around the world to be held to the
standards of care, speed and efficiency expected of major banks
in the world's financial centres?
All this suggests that article 13(a) is unlikely to do more
than reinforce the view of national courts that the position
they already adopt-whatever it may be-is the right one.
2. The concept of good faith
There is another, and potentially more serious, challenge
to the principle of strict compliance, namely the concept of
good faith. A general concept of good faith has long been a
tenet of the civil law and has been spreading rapidly to other
legal families. It is featured, for example, in the American Uniform Commercial Code,' the Vienna Sales Convention,' the
EC Directives on self-employed commercial agents2 6 and unfair terms in consumer contracts, ' the UNCITRAL Convention,' and the UNIDROIT Conventions on International Factoring29 and International Financial Leasing,"0 as well as in

24. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994).

25. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1980). Article 7(1) is a formulation that
is becoming a standard provision in international trade conventions. See, for example, the conventions referred to in notes 28-30 infra.
26. Council Directive 86/653, arts. 3(1), 4(1), 1986 O.J. (L 382) 17.
27. Council Directive 93/13, art. 3(1), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, 31.
28. Arts. 5, 19; see supra p. 2 and infra p. 18.
29. UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, supra note 6, art. 4(1),
27 LL.M. at 943.
30. UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial Leasing, supra note 7,

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXI:

the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts3 ' and the separate Principles of European Contract
Law3 2 issued by the Commission on European Contract Law.
Only two years ago an English court, applying Swiss law, held
that it would be contrary to the principles of good faith to
allow a bank to rely on discrepancies to refuse payment under
a letter of credit when it had received the proceeds of a backto-back letter of credit.'
English law does not as yet possess any general principle
of good faith in contracts. Its courts, conscious of London's
position as a world financial centre, are wary of such opentextured concepts and the degree of unpredictability perceived
as likely to result from their introduction.' It is not clear how
long this approach will be maintained. Once the courts have
become accustomed to handling good faith in the context of the
EC Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts, they may
find that they can live with it after all. Even so, it is not clear
what implications this would have for the bank's right to reject
non-conforming documents tendered under a letter of credit.
Where, in contrast to the Swiss bank case, the bank has no
interest of its own in the outcome of the presentation, is its
own good faith to be determined by whether a rejection of the
documents by its customer would be in good faith, or is some
other criterion to be applied? And how far should the requirement of good faith incline the court towards adopting a substantial compliance standard?
As a further example of the difficulties, consider article
19(1) of the UNCITRAL Convention. 5 This states that where
it is manifest and clear that any document is not genuine or

art. 6(1), 27 I.L.M. at 931.
31. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 1.7(1) (1994).
32. COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN

CONTRACT LAW art. 1.106(1) (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 1995).
33. Hannesman Handel, A.G. v. Kaunlaren Shipping Corp., [1993] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 91. The case was wholly unusual, for the bank was aware of the falsity of
the documents but relied on them to obtain payment of the assigned proceeds. The
court's refusal to allow the bank to invoke the non-conformity of the documents is
therefore understandable. It is interesting to speculate whether the outcome would
have been different if the letter of credit had been governed by English law.
34. But see Steyn J. (now Lord Steyn), The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy?, 1991 DENNING L.J. 131.
35. Art. 19(1); see supra p. 2 and infra p. 18.
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has been falsified, no payment is due on the basis asserted or
judging by the type and purpose of the undertaking the demand has no conceivable basis, then the guarantor/issuer,
acting in good faith, has a right, as against the beneficiary, to
withhold payment. What does good faith mean in this context?
If it is clear that the payment is not due, how can the bank be
acting in bad faith if it refuses payment?
B. The Treatment of Non-Documentary Conditions
It is a fundamental rule of the UCP that banks only deal
with documents, not with goods or services or with external
facts, and that only documentary conditions for payment can
properly be included in the credit.36 Unfortunately, banks and
their customers all too often overlook this basic principle, so
that credits are issued which subject payment to external conditions, such as the quality of the goods or the mode or time of
shipment. Literally construed, these conditions would require
the bank to satisfy itself that the goods were in fact of proper
quality and were in fact shipped in the designated manner or
by the specified time, matters which the bank is not wellequipped to investigate and could not be expected to investigate within the short time allowed for a decision whether to
accept or reject the documents.
In preparing the 1993 revision of the UCP, the Banking
Commission of the ICC decided that it was high time to inject
a sense of order and discipline into the market-place. This it
has done with a vengeance in its new article 13(c), which
states in peremptory terms that:
If a Credit contains without stating the document(s) to be
presented in compliance therewith, banks will deem such
conditions not stated and will disregard them.37
Though the objective is laudable, I suspect that the cure
may prove worse than the disease. Until now courts have been
able to construe conditions in letters of credit as intended to be

36. Ironically, the UCP infringe upon their own principle in art. 43, which
provides for refusal of documents presented after the expiry of a given period from
the date of shipment! Presumably what is meant is the date shown on the bill of
lading or other shipping document. See U.C.P. art. 43 (1993).
37. Id. art. 13(c).
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documentary in character, so that a requirement as to some
external fact has been treated as a requirement to produce
satisfactory documentary evidence of that fact. This sensible
approach now seems barred, for if the documents are not stated article 13(c) comes into play and the condition is required to
be ignored. This poses acute problems. First, it involves the
bank treating as nugatory a condition of its own credit which
itself has inserted into the letter of credit, albeit at the request
of its customer. Second, it raises a question whether the bank
owes its customer a duty to warn that the stipulated condition
will be of no effect. Third, since the parties are free to exclude
or modify any provision of the UCP, how is one to determine
whether the inclusion of a non-documentary condition is to be
void under article 13(c) or a binding condition intended to
operate outside the UCP altogether?
C. The Autonomy Principle and its Exceptions
A fundamental principle of documentary credits law is the
autonomy of the credit, that is, its independence both from the
underlying trade transaction between the applicant for the
credit and the beneficiary, and from the relationship between
the former and the issuing bank. This concept, enshrined in
articles 3 and 4 of the UCP,' is widely recognised and applied by courts around the world. So, in general, it is not a defence to a claim on the credit that the beneficiary appears to
have committed a breach of the underlying contract, that the
contract is unenforceable (e.g., for illegality), or that the applicant for the credit has failed to put funds in the issuing bank.
This is scarcely surprising, for the typical letter of credit transaction sets up a series of engagements involving different parties, and it would be strange if a breach of contract between,
for example, the beneficiary and the applicant for the credit,
were to constitute a defence to a claim under an entirely separate engagement between issuing bank and beneficiary, an
engagement to which the applicant for the credit is not a party.
The extension of the UCP to cover credits issued by a bank
for its own account 39 -namely, to discharge an obligation in-

38. Id. arts. 3-4 (1993).
39. Id. art. 2 (1993).
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curred to the beneficiary by the bank itself-raises the question whether in this two-party situation the letter of credit still
remains independent of the underlying transaction. Here, the
parties to the two engagements are identical, so that the doctrinal arguments for treating one engagement as independent
of the other are less compelling. Nevertheless, the general
principle must still apply. There is nothing particularly novel
in an arrangement by which the payment obligation under a
commercial contract is tapped off into a separate contract insulated from the main agreement. The typical case is the bill of
exchange given in payment for goods or services and considered to generate a distinct contract between holder, drawer,
and acceptor.
What is distinctive about the letter of credit is the degree
of insulation which is afforded as a result of its abstract character. Except as against a holder in due course, a party who
would otherwise be liable on a bill of exchange can plead a
total or partial failure of the consideration for which the bill
was given. So a buyer of goods sued on a bill, who has exercised a right to reject the goods for non-conformity with the
sale contract, can plead that the consideration for the bill has
wholly failed. But, as we have seen, a documentary credit is a
form of abstract payment undertaking which is not required to
be supported by consideration in the first place. It follows that
the question of failure of consideration cannot arise. This must
apply just as much to a credit issued for the issuer's own account as to one issued for the account of a third party, for the
payment undertaking is just as abstract in the former case as
in the latter.
All jurisdictions admit of certain exceptions to the autonomy principle. In particular, fraud on the part of the beneficiary
or his agent in relation to documents tendered under the credit
disentitles the beneficiary to payment. In England, other
defences have been admitted, such as illegality affecting the
letter of credit transaction, set-off between beneficiary and
issuing bank, and rescission of the letter of credit transaction
on the ground that it was induced by misrepresentation. In the
United States it is not necessary that the fraud should relate
to the documents; fraud in the underlying transaction suffices.
In many jurisdictions the ambit of the exceptions to the autonomy principle has been a matter of considerable debate and
controversy. Is there conduct short of fraud which nevertheless
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makes a claim on the credit abusive? Is fraud on the part of
a third party for whose acts the beneficiary is not legally responsible a defence? Suppose that such fraud consists in the
forgery of a document presented under the credit. Can the
beneficiary say that he is innocent of the fraud and entitled to
payment, or can the bank plead that while it is entitled to pay
against a forged document which appears on its face to be
genuine it is not obliged to do so, since a forged document is
not a document that conforms to the credit?" What is meant
by fraud in the underlying transaction (for example, does it
cover fraud not reflected in the documents at all, such as a
fraudulent misrepresentation by the seller inducing the buyer
to enter into the contract of sale) and how far is this a defence?
There is a divergence of views not only between different law
systems, but even within the same law system both on what
constitutes a defence to a claim on a credit and on the approach to be taken by the court on an application for interim
injunctive relief. It is therefore helpful that the UNCITRAL
Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of
Credit has addressed these issues.42 Indeed, it is this part of
the Convention
which is one of the most likely to be of practi43
cal utility.

III. DEMAND GUARANTEES AND STANDBY CREDITS
A. Demand Guarantees and Documentary Credits:
Comparisons and Contrasts
I now turn to demand guarantees. As noted earlier, the
documentary credit is designed to ensure the discharge of a

40. This question has surfaced with particular force in relation to claims on
demand guarantees.

41. In the English House of Lords decision in United City Merchants anv.)
Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord), [1983] 1 App. Cas. 168,
Lord Diplock, in an obiter dictum, opined that even forgery of a document did not
necessarily disentitle the innocent beneficiary to payment. In my view, this confuses two entirely distinct defences, the fraud defence (which is available only against
a beneficiary who or whose agent has been involved in the fraud) and the logically
anterior defence that the document, if not genuine, does not conform to the credit.
For a more extended criticism of Lord Diplock's speech, see Roy Goode, Abstract
Payment Undertakings, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 209, 229 (Peter Cane &

Jane Stapleton eds., 1991).
42. Arts. 19-20.
43. See infra p. 19.
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payment obligation. By contrast, the demand guarantee is used
almost exclusively to secure the performance of a non-monetary obligation-typically the execution of construction works
or the delivery of conforming goods under a contract of
sale 4 4-- and is conceived as a default mechanism. It is the
principal (the equivalent of the applicant for the credit in a
documentary credit transaction) who is primarily responsible
for the performance to which the demand guarantee relates,
and the agreement between principal and beneficiary requires,
expressly or by implication, that the beneficiary resort to the
bank only if the principal defaults. So whereas a bank pays a
documentary credit only if things go right, in the case of a
demand guarantee it is intended that the bank will be called
upon to pay only if things go wrong. But the agreement as to
the default nature of the demand guarantee is internal to the
principal-beneficiary relationship and does not concern the
bank, whose duty is to pay against a written demand and such
other documents, if any, as the guarantee may specify. Thus
the demand guarantee shares with the documentary credit the
characteristic that it is an abstract payment undertaking,
insulated from the underlying trade transaction, but differs
from the documentary credit in that it is improper for the
beneficiary to call the guarantee if he does not honestly believe
that the principal has committed a breach of the underlying
contract. Accordingly, the problem of unfair or abusive calls is
peculiar to demand guarantees and cannot arise in relation to
documentary credits, where it is agreed from the outset that
the bank, not the principal, is to be the first port of call for
payment.
Three further differences between documentary credits
and demand guarantees may be noted. First, the former usually involve the presentation of a substantial volume of documents, and more often than not these fail to conform to the
credit on first presentation, whereas the documentation required for a claim on a demand guarantee is skeletal in the
extreme, entailing in most cases presentation of no more than
the written demand itself. Second, the making of "extend or
pay" demands is a particular feature of demand guarantee

44. This is one of the many respects in which the demand guarantee differs
from the standby credit, which is frequently used to underpin payment obligations.

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXI:

practice for which the URDG (though not the UNCITRAL
Convention) made special provision. Third, in a four-party
demand guarantee transaction the position of the parties to
the counter-guarantee has to be covered.
I will look at two major issues arising under the URDG,
the formalities for a valid demand and the treatment of extend
or pay demands. But first I should like to make a brief comment about the position of standby letters of credit.
B. Standby Letters of Credit
Standby letters of credit were brought within the UCP for
the first time in the 1983 revision, primarily to alleviate the
concerns of American banks, most of whom were prohibited
from issuing suretyship guarantees and were anxious to send a
signal to American courts that standby credits were to be
equated with autonomous documentary credits, not with suretyship guarantees. Are standby credits also within URDG?
The treatment of standby credits in relation to URDG has
an interesting history. A late draft of the URDG actually contained a provision declaring that the URDG were inapplicable
to standby credits. I pointed out that such a provision would
set upon the courts an impossible task, for from a legal viewpoint demand guarantees and standby credits are indistinguishable, and the latter clearly falls within the definition of a
demand guarantee in article 2. Accordingly, the first draft,
prepared by the Drafting Group established to finalise a text
and resolve the impasse reached in the original Working Party,
made explicit reference to standby credits in article 2. However, bankers were understandably keen to keep the UCP as the
applicable set of rules, since it was more detailed and the
courts were familiar with the concept. In the end a compromise
was reached. The draft was revised to omit specific reference to
standby credits in the text of the rules, whilst the introduction
made it clear that standby credits were technically within the
rules but that banks were advised to continue using the UCP.
This solution was approved by the two Commissions involved
in the preparation of the rules, the Banking Commission and
the Commission on International Commercial Practice.
It has to be said that the treatment of standby credits is
not entirely satisfactory. On the one hand, the UCP are much
more detailed and therefore deal with matters that are not at
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present covered by the URDG, including the issue of a credit
for the insurer's own account and the confirmation of a credit.
On the other hand, the UCP are conceptually inappropriate for
standby credits, 5 since almost all of the provisions are designed for situations in which the obligation under the underlying trade transaction is a payment obligation and the issuing
bank is the first port of call for payment. The UNCITRAL
Convention46 produces the converse situation in which, as a
last minute addition to the text, parties to a commercial credit
can opt into the Convention, despite the fact that all its other
provisions are geared to instruments that cannot properly be
called except in the event of the principal's default.
C. Formalitiesfor a Valid Demand
Article 20 of the URDG contains a very distinctive rule
requiring the beneficiary to present with his demand a statement that the principal is in breach, and the respect in which
he is in breach." This requirement applies even if on its face
the only document specified is the demand itself, unless the
guarantee expressly excludes article 20. The purpose of article
20 is to impose some constraint on unfair calling of the guarantee without undermining its efficacy as a swift remedy in
the event of a perceived default. The constraint is somewhat
limited in that the statement of breach is required only from
the beneficiary himself, not from an independent third party.
Even so, a beneficiary who has little compunction in making a
written demand where there has been no breach may feel
somewhat inhibited from doing so where he has to commit
himself to a false statement of breach. To ensure that article
20 is not overlooked there is much to be said for setting out its
terms in the text of the guarantee, as is done with the ICC
Model Forms for Issuing Demand Guarantees.48 A demand by
45. In many cases, the UCP is impossible to apply. For example, the default
rule in the UCP which holds that documents must be presented within 21 days of
the date of shipment (U.C.P. art. 43(a) (1993)) is a completely meaningless requirement when applied to demand guarantees.
46. See infra p. 18.
47. The phrase, "the respect in which" (as opposed to "respects"), is intended
to require only a general statement of the nature of the breach (e.g., that the
principal has been guilty of delay, defective workmanship, and a shortfall in delivery of goods), not a detailed specification. See ROY GOODE, GUIDE TO THE ICC
UNIFOR

RULES FOR DEMAND GUARANTEES 93-94 (1992).

48. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 503(E), ICC MODEL
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the guarantor under the counter-guarantee given by the instructing party (the principal's bank) must specify not only
that the guarantor has itself received a demand from the beneficiary but that the demand conforms to article 20.
D. "Extend or Pay" Demands
It is not uncommon for a beneficiary to present an "extend
or pay" demand requiring the period of the guarantee to be
extended, failing which payment is to be made forthwith. Demands of this kind are not necessarily improper, for there may
have been, or the beneficiary may honestly though mistakenly
believe that there has been, a breach of the underlying contract but may be willing to allow time for this to be rectified if
the guarantee is extended. The first point to note is that if the
demand is to be triggered automatically because of non-extension of the guarantee it must be a demand which conforms to
the rules, in particular to the requirements of article 20. Upon
receiving the extend or pay demand the guarantor must, without delay, inform the party who gave him his instructions49
and must suspend payment for as long as is reasonable to
permit the principal and the beneficiary to reach agreement on
the granting of the extension and to enable the principal to
arrange for such extension to be issued. There are various
possible outcomes. The principal may agree to the extension,
wholly or in part, in which case it takes effect when issued by
the guarantor. The guarantor is not obliged to issue it, and
even if he has agreed with the principal to do so, that is not an
agreement of which the beneficiary can take advantage. Alternatively, the principal may refuse the extension, in which case
the guarantor must pay in the absence of fraud by the beneficiary or some other vitiating factor. A third possibility is that
the beneficiary withdraws the demand, which thereupon lapses. Finally, negotiations may still be in progress when a reasonable time has elapsed, in which event the guarantor must
pay, even if by then the guarantee has expired."

FORMS FOR ISSUING DEMAND GUARANTEES (1994).
49. Thus, in the case of a direct guarantee, the guarantor would inform the
principal, and in the case of an indirect guarantee, the guarantor would inform
the instructing party.
50. This is because the rules require only that the documents be presented
before expiry (U.CP. arts. 19, 22 (1993)). The time when payment falls due after
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E. The UNCITRAL Convention
In the light of the URDG, it is at first sight somewhat
surprising that UNCITRAL has invested such time and effort
in producing its 1995 Convention on Independent Guarantees
and Standby Letters of Credit covering much of the same
ground. The reason for this is historical. Soon after
UNCITRAL first began to look at demand guarantees, the ICC
began its project to formulate a set of demand rules designed
to be more accommodating of prevailing practice than the 1978
rules.5 Thereupon, UNCITRAL agreed to halt further work
and defer to the ICC project. Unfortunately, this proceeded
much more slowly than had been expected, and when after the
lapse of several years it showed no signs of reaching finality.
UNCITRAL understandably decided to proceed with its own
proposals for a convention or uniform law. By the time the
URDG had got back on track, the UNCITRAL project was considered too far advanced to be abandoned. Moreover, being a
work designed to lead either to a Convention or to a uniform
law capable of adoption in national legislation it was able to
deal with matters that could not properly be the subject of
contractually incorporated rules, notably the effect of fraud and
the grant of interim injunctive relief. In its treatment of contractual relations between the parties, the Convention follows
the URDG fairly closely in scope and effect, though the drafting is somewhat different and the draft Convention does not
contain any equivalent of article 20, nor does it deal with extend or pay demands.
Given that the contractual aspects of the Convention can
be excluded by agreement of the parties, it is unlikely that in
relation to these aspects the Convention will ever play a significant role, for in the great majority of cases the parties will
incorporate either the URDG or the UCP, and in either case
the effect will be to displace those provisions of the Convention
dealing with contractual rights and duties. It is in the field of
defences to a payment claim and the ground for interim injunctive relief that the influence of the Convention is most likely to
be felt. It will be interesting to see how effective it will be in

exhaustion of the article 26 procedure is irrelevant.
51. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 328, UNIFORM RULES
FOR CONTRACT GUARANTEES (1978).
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reducing the divergences of approach between national courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined some of the more important
concepts underlying the UCP, the URDG and the UNCITRAL
Convention. What significance do these instruments have for
the general development of transnational commercial law? I
believe that they provide a further demonstration of the enormous influence of trade practice and the needs of legitimate
business on the development of commercial law. So strong is
this influence that sooner or later evolving business practice
will always break free from the shackles of doctrine and jurisprudence and demand acceptance by the courts or the legislature. Typically, the process of harmonisation begins not with
any international instrument but with conscious or unconscious judicial parallelism as the courts in each country respond to the needs of that country's business community. So by
the time work is begun on uniform rules a considerable measure of international consensus on law and practice will already have developed, despite major divergences in the general
contract law of the legal systems involved. The extent to which
these divergences can be reconciled or cast aside is a striking
testimony to the pressure for a new lex mercatoriawhich, as in
the Middle Ages, will transcend national boundaries and bring
different systems of law into harmony through the usages of
trade.

